One astute politician commented while watching former Prime Minister Saad Hariri's news in Beirut: "When all politicians, without exception, show such a strong desire to return to political work, we should be wary. In Lebanon, no politician can please everyone without falling out of favor, sooner or later."
This article was originally published in, translated from Lebanese newspaper al-Joumhouria.
Some ask: Do the leaders of the sects want Hariri to return to political life as a party leader, a sect, and a potential prime minister? Or are they maneuvering? In other words, are they disadvantaged and losers in his absence, and will they be relieved by his return?
The first aspect relates to the Sunni sect. When Hariri suspended his political work and the activities of his movement two years ago, a significant political shift occurred within this sect. The era of Harirism, which constituted a Sunni political movement that extended throughout Lebanon over three decades, was temporarily closed. With this departure, the sect returned to the pre-"phenomenon" state shaped by his father, late former Prime Minister Rafic Hariri, when leadership was distributed among competing regional figures in Beirut, Tripoli, Sidon, Akkar, and elsewhere.
In the past two years, three phenomena were observed within the Sunni sect:
1. Increased ability of Hezbollah and its allies to attract some of the sects, in contrast to the opposition and reformists attracting others.
2. The emergence of Mikati's role as prime minister.
3. Dar al-Fatwa adopted a new approach to the political reality within the sect after always serving as a religious umbrella for Hariri's politics.
Therefore, the "revival" of Harirism will reshape the political landscape within the Sunni sect.
It was notable when Mikati said, during his reception of Hariri at the Grand Serail two days ago: "Here, we are guests at his place." This statement carries an essence of honor and courtesy, but it also holds many political implications that Mikati is well aware of. When Hariri returns, he will be the most likely candidate to head any government, and Mikati will return to his former position. Therefore, is there any interest in Mikati and other figures aspiring to lead the government in Hariri's return to political activity?
The second challenge lies in the approach of the Christian members of the March 14 coalition, particularly the Lebanese Forces. It is in their interest for Hariri to indeed return to political life, provided that he aligns with them and together they form a balanced political force in opposition to the expansion of Hezbollah and its allies within the government. This group is optimistic that Hariri will correct his previous approach, as he was the cause of the shock they experienced. Moreover, Saudi Arabia will guarantee Hariri's new approach to the government.
The third challenge lies within the Shiite community, where the "duo" of Hariri is expected to return to his previous approach. Some estimate that Hariri will return to political action under the Saudi-Iranian agreement, following the Beijing agreement, not confrontation as it was in the past. They believe that the Kingdom will take charge of controlling the voices of Christian dissent.
In fact, regarding the issue of Hariri's return up to this point, the following has occurred: The man received a preliminary signal from the Kingdom indicating the possibility of his return to political activity, provided that it is within a settlement endorsed by the Quint Committee, satisfying Riyadh, and including Tehran. However, the internal settlement is linked to what is happening in the south and the potential agreements there following the war's end in Gaza. Therefore, the settlement can be considered postponed until further notice.
In the meantime, what has been achieved so far can be maintained for future construction. The preliminary indication of Hariri's return has been issued. With it, extensive reception campaigns, both party-based and famous, would have occurred. Hariri has visited the references and launched positions closely related to the Kingdom through the media.
Therefore, the return will become a plausible option when the appropriate conditions are met. While it is true that every internal party wants Hariri to wield his influence to tip the political scale in their favor according to their interests, Hariri himself will adhere to one fundamental steadfastness this time: not to upset the Kingdom. This is anticipated by "the duo," but they are betting that the Kingdom's approach today is no longer as it was in 2017.
In any case, the Saudi guarantee remains a necessary option, as acknowledged by all players. There is no internal settlement without the Kingdom, nor, of course, the billions of dollars that everyone, especially "the duo," wants to try to "salvage" what remains of the country and its collapsed institutions.