The evolving story of the Lebanese-Syrian border: Smuggling and escalating international pressure take center stage

Report by Nada Andraos, English adaptation by Karine Keuchkerian

The story of the Lebanese-Syrian border dates back to the establishment of the two countries and the demarcation of Greater Lebanon's borders.

This border, which stretches at least 370 kilometers, features curves and overlapping lands, a reality that has strengthened smuggling, mixed interests, and border disputes under various pretexts between factions, smugglers, and armed groups on both sides. 

The issue became more complex when the decision was made to cut Hezbollah's arms supply lines through Syrian territory following the ceasefire agreement in the south and the fall of the Assad regime in Syria.

After the fall of the Assad regime, the new administration under President Ahmed al-Sharaa announced it did not want conflicts with Lebanon or to interfere in its affairs.

Contact was made with the Lebanese side to control the border, but in parallel, various issues arose, especially along the Bekaa border, where Shiite villages and towns are located and where Hezbollah has influence.

The most serious incident occurred in the town of Qasr on Sunday night between armed Syrian groups and Lebanese groups. 

It was later reported that the conflict stemmed from disputes between smuggling gangs from both sides. However, its consequences and outcomes go beyond that.

What happened is likely to repeat itself, especially since it went beyond border disputes between smugglers and impacted the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701 amid the significant changes taking place in the Middle East.

Just as in the south, in the east and north, there is an international and regional decision to disarm Hezbollah and restrict all weapons in Lebanon to the Lebanese army. 

Therefore, what is happening on the borders, starting from Hawsh al-Sayyid Ali, Qasr, and other Shiite-populated regions, is effectively a de facto demarcation imposed by the presence of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham on the Syrian side and its willingness to carry out operations against Lebanese areas to force them to disarm, including Hezbollah fighters and even local residents.

Thus, in 2025, after the fall of the Assad regime, what was proposed years ago—specifically in 2006 when Resolution 1701 was issued to halt the fighting in the July War, which at the time called for disarming and limiting weapons to the authority's control, and possibly deploying international forces on the border—has returned to the forefront. 

This time, the focus is on disarming Hezbollah first and, perhaps later, the potential deployment of international forces.