From ceasefire to framework: How the 2026 ceasefire redefines Lebanon-Israel terms

Report by Bassam Abou Zeid, English adaptation by Yasmine Jaroudi

The gap between the November 27, 2024, ceasefire agreement and the April 16, 2026, U.S.-issued memorandum reveals a significant shift in how the war between Lebanon and Israel is being addressed.

While both documents aim to halt hostilities, they differ in scope, substance, and political vision.

The 2024 agreement was negotiated by Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri, acting as a mediator on behalf of Hezbollah. In contrast, the 2026 memorandum reflects a shift in representation, with President Joseph Aoun leading the diplomatic track, backed by the government.

Substantively, the 2024 deal focused on containing escalation and regulating rules of engagement, without seriously addressing a comprehensive settlement. 

However, the 2026 memorandum goes further, explicitly referring to the absence of a state of war between the two countries, mutual recognition of sovereignty, and a path toward a long-term security arrangement and lasting peace.

On the issue of arms, the earlier agreement identified six parties authorized to bear weapons in Lebanon and outlined a gradual, open-ended plan to dismantle illegitimate military infrastructure, starting south of the Litani River. 

The 2026 memorandum narrows this framework, restricting arms exclusively to Lebanese state security institutions—including the army, internal security forces, general security, state security, customs, and municipal police—across the entire territory, rather than limiting it to the north or south of the Litani River. It specifies that the matter is now restricted to the security forces, which are responsible for Lebanon's sovereignty and national defense, and highlights that no country or faction has the right to claim to guarantee Lebanon's sovereignty.

Another notable difference is the absence in the 2026 memorandum of references to international resolutions or the Taif Agreement, both of which were included in the 2024 framework.

The issue of Israeli withdrawal also marks a key divergence. 

The 2024 agreement mentioned a gradual Israeli pullout beginning with the cessation of hostilities. Meanwhile, the 2026 memorandum makes no explicit mention of such a withdrawal.

Perhaps the most contentious clause in the new memorandum is one that allows Israel alone to carry out military action at any time under the pretext of "self-defense," even during the ceasefire period. In contrast, the 2024 agreement recognized the right of self-defense for both Lebanon and Israel in accordance with international law.

Practically, the differences point to a broader turning point. The 2024 agreement represented an attempt to manage an existing reality, while the 2026 memorandum appears to aim at reshaping it.

Yet, beyond the agreements, the core challenge remains their implementation, and the ability to sustain them amid shifting power dynamics on the ground, as regional attention remains closely tied to ongoing negotiations between Washington and Tehran.