The Lebanese stakeholders are approaching the presidential election without seriousness, much like their response to any external initiatives or efforts.
Some are attempting to distract or amuse themselves by throwing names around, while others are deepening their expectations and placing bets on reaching an agreement or solution.
However, it seems that no one is in a hurry to resolve the situation. While the international community is making efforts and initiatives to elect a president for Lebanon, it doesn't appear to be a strategic demand or a priority for them.
The international community is taking what it wants, whether a president is elected or not. What matters most to foreign powers is that they don't incur any cost in achieving a settlement in Lebanon, which they are pursuing to prevent further collapse.
Among the positions of foreign powers, there are American demands for the election of a president. The French are actively pursuing an initiative that calls for an agreement on the president, prime minister, and the mechanism for their formation.
The Egyptian position aims to maintain balance and the state's institutions, fearing a larger and more comprehensive collapse. The Saudi position has remained consistent since 2020, emphasizing the need for comprehensive political, economic, and financial reforms in Lebanon.
Qatar's position, expressed by the Emir of Qatar at the United Nations General Assembly, is that Lebanon is approaching a dangerous situation and must be assisted. Within this context, Qatar's actions in Lebanon can be seen as exploratory moves to understand what can be built upon for a settlement.
All these positions indicate two things: a lack of seriousness among some members of the international group (the Quintet) in terms of not delving into details and not presenting clear and direct proposals. In contrast, other forces are actively trying to understand what can be done and are engaging in detailed discussions.
France, for example, has immersed itself in details from which it seems unable to extricate itself, and its initiative has encountered difficulties.
On the other hand, Qatar's approach, starting with the visit of Qatar's Deputy Foreign Minister Dr. Mohammed bin Abdulaziz Al-Khulaifi to Beirut, involves listening to various political factions and collecting positions without committing to specific details.
Just as some factions lack seriousness externally, especially since Lebanon does not appear to be a priority for these countries, there is also a lack of internal seriousness in dealing with the presidential election.
This is evident in the leaks that various factions are releasing regarding meetings with the Qatari envoy, for example, or previously with the French envoy Jean-Yves Le Drian.
Each faction inside Lebanon seeks to leak information that aligns with its agenda and political context, often tailored to its preferences and perspectives.
Consequently, contradictory leaks have emerged regarding the names or options being discussed with the Qatari envoy. At times, it is leaked that Qatar is endorsing the Army Commander as a choice, and at other times, there is mention of support for the Director-General of General Security, Elias El-Bayssari. Additionally, there are two lists of names circulating, with most names being the same but with changes in their order.
The first list, as leaked, includes the names of Army Commander Joseph Aoun, MP Neemat Ephrem, General Security Director General Elias El-Bayssari, and former Minister Ziad Baroud. The second list leaked later contains three names: Army Commander Joseph Aoun, General Security Director General Elias El-Bayssari, and former Intelligence Chief George Khoury. Subsequently, a third paper emerged, merging all these names, adding George Khoury to the first list but altering the order, with Elias El-Bayssari placed at the top, followed by Neemat Ephrem, then George Khoury, and finally Army Commander Joseph Aoun.
This paper has received numerous comments, with some highlighting that Qatar does not endorse the Army Commander's name. Others have explained that discussions revolved around Suleiman Frangieh's possession of 51 votes, making it impossible to secure his election. In contrast, the Army Commander does not have the approval of Hezbollah, the Amal Movement, and the Free Patriotic Movement, making it impossible for him to reach sixty votes under the current circumstances.
As a result, Nemat Ephrem was proposed by some, a figure whom Hezbollah considers aligned with the March 14 Alliance, and who has interests in the Gulf and the United States. Therefore, he is unlikely to gain the approval of the party, leading to a third option being considered. This prompted a change in the order of the names being presented.
In this context, those who are enthusiastic about proposing Elias El-Bayssari stand out due to his good relations with all parties, without any negative stance from Hezbollah or the Free Patriotic Movement. However, all of this remains within the realm of security leaks, which do not demonstrate seriousness in addressing the presidential election but rather place all proposals in the category of burning more names, consuming more time, and wasting opportunities.