As regional powers spend billions, can Lebanon define its defense strategy?

Report by Lara El Hachem, English adaptation by Karine Keuchkerian

Two presidential terms have passed, two presidents have changed, and multiple dialogue sessions have been held, yet Lebanon’s defense strategy has remained little more than a slogan — raising a central question: What, then, is a defense strategy in the first place?

Simply put, it is the military rulebook — the state’s plan to defend itself internally and externally. It includes offensive and defensive doctrines, as well as securing the necessary capabilities.

The reason it has stalled is tied to the deep divide over the role and usefulness of Hezbollah’s weapons.

That was the case before the so-called “war of support.” After that war, however, the gap widened further — between those who see Hezbollah’s arsenal as Lebanon’s last remaining source of strength, and those who argue that the recent war proved the weapons serve no real purpose.

In the second year of President Joseph Aoun’s term, the national security strategy he referenced in his inaugural address — covering finance, the environment, the economy, defense, and other sectors — has yet to be finalized. Still, talk of a defense strategy persists.

Sources indicate that upon Aoun’s arrival at Baabda Palace, several retired officers, academics, and politicians offered their expertise to draft a defense plan. A proposal was prepared, but the version submitted to the presidential palace was deemed unsuitable. 

It linked the defense strategy to political considerations, while the presidency is seeking a comprehensive national defense strategy aligned with realities on the ground. Disagreements among the volunteers prevented the submission of a revised draft.

Beyond politics, however, can a defense strategy be formulated without solid economic foundations in a country that is effectively bankrupt? 

The answer lies in the defense budgets of countries in the region — from Saudi Arabia, whose defense spending reached $78 billion in 2025, to Israel, with a defense budget of $30 billion, and Qatar, which allocates $9.4 billion to defense.

What kind of strategy can be discussed when the Lebanese state struggles to pay its army’s salaries, while the army is deployed from south to north, tasked not only with ensuring that weapons remain exclusively in state hands but also with internal policing? And what strategy can be envisioned when international assistance today barely ensures continuity, unless the international community is convinced that the army is seriously advancing a clear, time-bound plan to fully consolidate arms under state authority?

It is the reality of the cycle Lebanon has been trapped in since the emergence of the “New Middle East” concept — a reality that makes a defense strategy today more distant than ever.