The refugee crisis is an impending time bomb, according to Kulluna Irada. The difficult humanitarian conditions refugees endure in Lebanon, combined with Syria’s refusal to allow their return and Lebanon’s escalating economic struggles, are contributing to a perfect storm. The advocacy group warns that potential social explosions are imminent as Lebanon’s control over the crisis wanes.
Kulluna Irada:
Syrian refugees make up about 25% of the population in Lebanon, the highest proportion among all countries hosting refugees.
The significant numbers that have entered Lebanon, fleeing the ongoing Syrian war for 12 years, have created a myriad of challenges. On one hand, refugees live in fragile and difficult humanitarian conditions while Syria refuses their return. On the other hand, the material burdens resulting from their presence increase amid an economic crisis. Lebanese labor market competition, additional pressure on an already decaying infrastructure, weak service sectors, declining security, rising racial tensions, and the Lebanese state's inability to control the situation all contribute to the crisis.
This reality is akin to a ticking time bomb, warning of potential social explosions as the Lebanese state withdraws from its role in managing this issue. Given the challenges of return and the impossibility of maintaining the current situation, there is an urgent national need to discuss the reality of Syrian refugees.
The Policy of Non-Policy
The Lebanese authorities have consistently adopted a "non-policy" approach to the issue of Syrian refugees, without offering any realistic solutions to confront the crisis. In 2014, they expressed their rejection of integrating refugees and building camps in an official document, which reflected in the unregulated presence of Syrians, resulting in many issues. In 2020, the authorities emphasized the need for a safe return in an official document that remains mere ink on paper.
The Lebanese state has withdrawn from its responsibility in organizing and managing this presence, hesitating because of the specter of resettlement. In 2011, it stopped registering refugees and transferred this task to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), thus abstaining from creating a database on refugee demographics, which weakened its ability to understand and respond to the crisis at various levels, including regulating the labor market.
The Lebanese state did not adopt a unified approach to the refugee crisis, which characterized its relationship with the international community as one of blackmail to obtain dollars through aid channels. However, this aid was not used in a sustainable way that benefits both Lebanese and Syrians.
The Lebanese state's management of the refugee issue has clashed with the problem of dealing with the Syrian regime, dictated by internal political divisions and opposing positions. While coordination at the security and political levels remained ongoing between the two countries, and while the Lebanese state acknowledged in its "General Policy Paper for the Return of the Displaced" in 2020 that one of the key pillars of a successful safe return for the displaced is cooperation and coordination with the Syrian state as the only entity capable of providing necessary guarantees, others rejected normalization with the Syrian regime. The Caesar Act and the risk of sanctions became additional factors in rejecting this cooperation.
Obstacles to Return
From the Syrian regime's perspective:
The Syrian regime refuses the return of refugees for fear of losing the military and field results it has achieved in Sunni-influenced areas, which would be a consequence of the return of the predominantly Sunni refugees.
The social reality in Syria prevents the return of refugees, especially as most of the areas they fled from have either been completely destroyed or overtaken by other internally displaced people, or their properties and lands have been confiscated by the Syrian regime under its expropriation laws.
The refugees' fear of the regime's reaction to them contributes to their non-return, either because a large number of them have evaded compulsory military service or due to their oppositional stance towards the regime.
From the international community's perspective:
The international community insists on a political solution to the conflict in Syria as a prerequisite for providing financial support for rehabilitation and reconstruction processes, which weakens the effectiveness of its interventions to resolve the crisis. Given this reality, the international community's inability to offer any alternative solution, other than providing aid to refugees in Lebanon and adopting a policy of acknowledging the status quo, becomes apparent.
Approach to Solutions
At the Lebanese level – The necessity of regulating the legal and social status of refugees in Lebanon:
Establish a mechanism for counting refugees based on the current numbers as a base, developing it, and allowing the Lebanese state to possess an updated database. This allows for the distinction between different categories of Syrians present in Lebanon, planning to address the current crisis, and securing necessary information to organize their return.
Start registration processes at its three levels: residency, marriage, and births. This facilitates the registration of marriages and births even when Syrians have lost their identification documents, to avoid the risks that might result from unregistered cases, especially since the birth registration rate for refugees did not exceed 36% by the end of 2022. It's worth noting that the registration process can be completed within a time-frame of 12 to 18 months, if the necessary financial and human resources are secured.
Regulate the labor market and ensure the implementation of existing laws by treating Syrians equally with foreigners, i.e., making them pay taxes and obtaining work permits.
Control the borders and illegal crossings, and provide political, logistical, and technical support to the security agencies to achieve this goal.
At the external level - The necessity of reaching an Arab and international agreement that guarantees the return of refugees:
Benefit from the current regional political situation and understandings between the countries of the region to invest in diplomacy, and develop a plan for the return of refugees under international and Arab sponsorship. Any agreement should include an approach to the following topics:
Push for solutions that allow the start of a dignified and sustainable return to some areas, parallel to work on a comprehensive political solution, accompanied by the necessity of working to extract a commitment from donor countries to contribute to reconstruction efforts starting from rehabilitating the areas designated for the return of refugees.
Urge the international community to take its responsibility in sharing the burdens of this crisis by raising resettlement rates and continuing financial support for Lebanon and the specific host communities.
Pressure the Syrian regime to extract serious commitments that ensure the removal of all obstacles to the return, especially through solving the issue of evasion from military service, stopping dealing from the security perspective, and ensuring refugees regain the lands from which they were displaced or were confiscated in the absence of their owners.