French envoy's visit to Lebanon: A failure or a ray of hope?

Is the upcoming visit of the French envoy, Jean-Yves Le Drian, doomed to failure before his arrival?

September 11th is the initial date set for his return, so what sets this visit apart?

Before delving into the local situation, we must consider a new dispute that Le Drian may not easily overcome.

This pertains to French President Emmanuel Macron's statement a week ago, in which he alluded to Tehran's involvement, stating, "I believe that one of the 'key' elements for a political solution in Lebanon is the clarification of regional interventions in this country, including Iran's interference."

Iran's response was swift, articulated by its Foreign Minister, Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, who, from Beirut, denied any interference by the Islamic Republic in Lebanon's internal affairs.

He also called it advice for the French President, urging him to focus on France's internal issues instead of criticizing Iran and interfering in other countries' matters.

Approximately a week before Le Drian's visit, the new French Ambassador to Lebanon, Hervé Magro, who is well-versed in Lebanese affairs, is expected to arrive in Beirut. Moreover, he will prepare the groundwork for the visit of the French Presidential envoy.

Locally, Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri's call for dialogue, which will be followed by consecutive electoral sessions to elect a president, may be one of the proposed ideas by Le Drian that the speaker has embraced.

However, the expected rejection by the thirty-one opposition MPs has slightly hindered it without necessarily meaning its failure. The call was welcomed by the Strong Lebanon Bloc, some independents, the Hezbollah and Amal Movement, and their allies.

One of the most notable expressions of support came from Maronite Patriarch Bechara Al-Rahi, who called for participation in the dialogue.

Furthermore, the stance of the thirty-one MPs was repeated about the pointlessness of dialogue and sitting with Hezbollah before electing a president with the criteria set in the recent Doha meeting.

On another note, the Kataeb party considers that the Patriarch's call also carried a commitment to the constitution, which they adhere to.

According to their sources, they stated to LBCI that they are not against dialogue if it aligns with consecutive electoral rounds with discussions and dialogues in between. However, the constitution does not mention a binding dialogue preceding the proposed electoral sessions.

Moreover, September is a crucial month in the presidential race, both internally and externally, given the increased level of local, regional, and international communication.

Thus, will the obstacles be overcome, and will there be an elected president before the end of the month? Or will the deadlock deepen, with its ramifications reflecting more on the economy?