In the context of the sectarian system that the Taef Agreement reproduced through the power-sharing formula, it appears that Lebanon is currently experiencing a battle to achieve a presidential settlement without the traditional representation of the "Sunnite component." As it is being marketed, it is absent or waiting on the sidelines of the conflict between the Shiite and Maronite wills.
This historical paradox is a natural result of the parliamentary elections, which saw the Future Movement exit the political scene and significantly transform the traditional Saudi role towards the Sunnite community in Lebanon. However, on the "bright" side - if not for the sectarian system - it reflects a kind of dynamism and flexibility in the Sunnite political arena that is lacking in other arenas, even though its essence is compromised due to a stagnant and dysfunctional parliament.
After the June 14 session, as well as before it, many discussed the absence of a substantial Sunnite force in shaping the presidential settlement, especially since Saad Hariri's experience, despite its failure, translated the role of the rhythm officer between the Maronite presidency and the Shiite duo holding the parliamentary presidency, through the formation of a consensual government governed by the blocking third, and the distribution of positions in public administrations as a crucial part of the settlement.
Thus, the narrative of regret over the role of Sunnite forces in shaping the presidential settlement can be interpreted as a loss of riding the wave in completing the Taef Agreement and sharing power with their Maronite and Shiite partners and other sectarian minorities.
Suppose the "political Harirism" gave Lebanese Sunnite momentum in their role within this sectarian system that has proven to be futile, relying on the economic power of late Prime Minister Rafic Hariri, his regional relationships, and his pivotal role internally and externally. In that case, the traditional forces are dealing with the current Sunnite forces because, for the first time, they do not possess a strong and independent political compass of their own.
Meanwhile, amid the existing polarization, the Sunnites seem to be paying the price for the collapse of the post-Taef "political economy" model, which has placed them in a position of defending it and their gains without having the resources and tools for effective defense. It is as if they are protecting themselves without possessing a weapon.
On the other hand, two proposals are more achievable in the eyes of their partners within the sectarian system. There is a Christian proposal that leans towards a form of federalism or, to a lesser extent, "expanded decentralization," and a Shiite proposal that leans towards a strategy of fully grasping the system while preserving the image of sectarianism.
In both cases, the Sunnite component is an appendage rather than a decision-maker.
In reality, the orientations of Sunnite voices in the recent twelfth session, which failed to elect a president amidst the division between the candidates Jihad Azour and Sleiman Frangieh, showed that their choices were distributed as follows: between voting in favor of accommodating the status quo from both sides, and between voting within non-sectarian civil options, and between voting based on regional, familial, and personal interests.
However, the civil and non-sectarian options came when other traditional forces had made very sectarian choices, making its proponents appear as if they were outside the arena of conflict.
Therefore, observers found that most of the Sunnite MPs seemed incapable of playing the role of a "kingmaker" in the presidential entitlement, as they stood on its threshold awaiting a regional signal or later aligning themselves with the battle's winner, hoping for some incidental gains.
This contrast is evident in the analysis of different poles regarding the role of the Sunnite component in the presidential process when asking some MPs about their interpretation of the current scene.
Practically speaking, the MPs disagree on the approach that the Sunnite component is exiting the presidential settlement for the first time.
While the Sunni bloc of the "National Accord" led by MP Faisal Karame voted in favor of Sleiman Frangieh, its deputy, Taha Naji, told "al-Modon": "We never agree with the notion that the Sunnite component is outside the presidential settlement. The results of the recent session proved that the Sunnite voice is decisive and pivotal in this process. Although the suspension of the Future Movement's political work initially created a gap, around 16 new deputies out of 27 Sunnite deputies quickly organized themselves. The National Moderation Bloc emerged, followed by the Gathering of Independent MPs and the National Accord Coalition. We do not see any reason for discouragement."
While MP Achraf Rifi remains steadfast in the opposing front against MPs loyal to Hezbollah, he tells "al-Modon": "The presidential election sessions have shown that the Sunnitw component is in a transitional phase and undergoing repositioning between what is described as 'sovereignists' and those loyal to Hezbollah, as well as a third party that takes different options."
Rifi believes that "the Sunnites are waiting for a regional platform to crystallize their role in Lebanon, and the majority (including himself) is looking towards Saudi Arabia, while another part looks towards Turkey.
He adds: "Saudi Arabia has not been absent; rather, it has changed its approach and perspective on the Lebanese issue."
On the other hand, MP Ibrahim Mneimneh from Beirut, along with a few others in Parliament, is keen on distinguishing their positioning outside the sectarian alignment. He tells "al-Modon": "There is a persistent insistence on sectarianizing various events, as is happening now in the presidential election, in an attempt to create sectarian balances aimed at cementing the system of quotas and preserving gains within it, which historically has harmed constitutional events."
He looks positively at the urgent transformations within the Sunnite component in Parliament, based on the notion that they have allowed independent MPs to pursue their battles and disagreements based on the political-economic agenda rather than sectarian calculations. They are resisting the existing system.
Mneimneh adds, "I find myself as one of the MPs pushing towards a civil state and commitment to the constitution, which is a progressive stance in light of the impotence of the sectarian system. This has compelled traditional forces to acknowledge the impact of our presence in Parliament and deal with our choices and proposals pragmatically."
Sunnite MPs aligned with Hezbollah, particularly the "National Accord" bloc, consider themselves to have political and parliamentary legitimacy to play a central role in the upcoming events, including forming the next government after appointing its prime minister.
Following the fall of previous prime ministers, Karameh may find himself a natural candidate for the premiership due to his position as the head of a parliamentary bloc. However, it may be challenging for him to reach this position.
In an indirect reference, Taha Naji says, "We will play a vital role in the formation of the next government after completing our role in achieving the presidential election."
While Ibrahim Mneimneh is betting on adherence to the constitution in accomplishing the tasks outside the logic of each sect maintaining its positions, Rifi seems more committed to the existing equation.
He says, "What we aspire to is to be a fully present component, to regain our rights in public administration, and to fight for our positions just as we understand the Christian component's fight to preserve the presidency against attempts to impose a candidate from the Shiite component."
At this time, Mostapha Alloush, a former leader in the Future Movement, believes that the Sunnite component is the one that has excluded itself from the negotiation table for now, whether due to the Future Movement's withdrawal from the race or as a result of the previous prime ministers' exit from the parliamentary equation.
He believes, in an interview with "al-Modon," that this scene has produced three categories of Sunnite MPs: more than a third of Sunnite MPs align with Hezbollah, a moderate category aligns with the traditional forces of March 14, and a small category is lost in their political choices.
He considers that the Sunnite component is politically keeping pace with the repercussions of Saudi Arabia's decision to allow international interaction and move away from sectarian alignment based on dealing with Lebanon as a state rather than being a patron of a sect.
He says, "This reality has created a new dynamic. In the past, having only one choice may not have been beneficial for the Sunnites. Still, they have lost their ability and effectiveness in influencing."