The French presidential envoy, Jean-Yves Le Drian, succeeded in reproducing Parisian roles in Lebanon as soon as he removed them from the equation of the presidency of the leader of the Marada Movement, Sleiman Frangieh.
This article was originally published in and translated from the Lebanese newspaper al-Liwaa.
He also succeeded in attracting Saudi interest after the "coldness" with which Riyadh dealt with it due to its refusal to make the presidential election an occasion to reanimate the system's "self-renewal" after the stagnation it suffered in the last three years.
There is no doubt that Le Drian's visit to Riyadh, where he met with Saudi Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud, along with the Adviser at the Royal Court Nizar al-Alula, who is responsible for the Lebanese file, and Ambassador Walid al-Bukhari, who left Beirut hastily because of this arranged meeting, constituted a revival of his mission, just as it indicated Saudi interest in the French developments that the presidential envoy emphasized as soon as he "mourned" Frangieh's choice, calling for sharpening "ambitions" for consensus on a third option.
Thus, the French envoy refined the ambiguity and weakness that afflicted his mission and the French endeavor in general, which began inadequately as soon as the crisis cell at the Elysee Palace believed that supporting Hezbollah and its circles was the only way to elect the president.
Moreover, the Quintet Committee, having aligned itself with Riyadh's opinion, was behind the specifications, consisting of a president free from financial and political corruption, completely cutting ties with the system, its past, and its practices.
This applies initially to the Prime Minister and later to the rest of the institutions' heads when the time for change comes.
The updated French maneuver and the realistic approach that Le Drian has adopted have the potential to rekindle Riyadh's interest in Lebanon.
He had informed some of those he met on his recent visit to Beirut that he is confident that there is no presidential solution except by consensus on a candidate who enjoys the maximum Lebanese and international acceptance. Consequently, it is necessary to reject both options of Frangieh, and the former minister, Jihad Azour.
However, he remained cautious in presenting any name, leaving the matter to the Lebanese consensus.
This French development has halted Saudi diplomacy. Paris has sensed Riyadh's interest in Le Drian's visit.
It has also started talking about the possibility of Saudi re-engagement after a withdrawal period. France's goal is no secret, which it repeatedly failed to achieve due to Riyadh's rejection of the previous French approach.
Based on this reality, Le Drian's return in early October is awaited to determine the extent to which France will go.
It does not seem that his mission has a specified time frame, contrary to what has been rumored, especially after President Emmanuel Macron
renewed his confidence in him, meaning his commitment to his envoy's vision rather than the approach (supporting Hezbollah and endorsing Frangieh), which the presidential advisor, Patrick Durel, followed for many months without achieving the desired results.
This French-Saudi development preceded the rush of the US administration through several officials, the latest of whom is the regional spokesperson for the US State Department, Samuel Werberg, to deny any US-French disagreement on the Lebanese issue while reaffirming the continuation of the work of the Quintet Committee in the same direction.
This American behavior can be seen as support for Le Drian's updated mission and perhaps as a way to contain Qatari initiatives and reduce Doha's pressure after sensing the pressure it is exerting on Lebanese officials and leaders to follow the options it endorses.
It is now known that the Qatari envoy, Jassim bin Fahd Al-Thani, who is preparing for a visit by State Minister of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Mohammed bin Abdulaziz Al-Khulaifi in the first half of October, has mixed the views of those he met recently, including MP Neemat Frem, Army Commander General Joseph Aoun, and Acting Director-General of the General Security, Brigadier General Elias al-Baysari.
He was keen to say that Doha does not seek to impose a name but accumulates opinions and positions. At the same time, it supports any presidential choice that garners the greatest Lebanese consensus.
All of this means that the start of the Lebanese solution cannot be isolated from external factors, and the two most prominent factors are the dialogue between Washington and Tehran, which is in full swing, and the Saudi-Iranian detente, which currently seems to be stumbling.
If the situation in Yemen deteriorates again after a relative breakthrough due to the start of dialogue in Riyadh between the Houthis and the Saudi leadership, there is a fear that this escalation will affect the Saudi-Iranian rapprochement, and then Lebanon will bear the consequences.