Lebanese lawmakers are at a new standstill after rejecting the dialogue Speaker of the Parliament Nabih Berri had urged.
After ten election sessions, they could not choose a new president for the republic.
With their eyes turned abroad for reconciliation, they bid this year farewell and will welcome a new one.
Therefore, today's election session will follow in the footsteps of its predecessors, and it is unknown if Berri will call for another election session the following year if there is no consensus on a president.
It has become a given that the nation entered into a deep stalemate until after the holidays and possibly beyond that. Any potential resolution or significant proposal regarding the presidential issue will not loom soon.
There have been talks about a Qatari role in the presidential issue, with credible reports about a developing Qatari initiative, the first indications of which will surface gradually following the World Cup and the conclusion of the holiday season.
According to the information, the Qatari side does not operate alone. International parties have joined the line and pushed to advance an initiative that certain parties, most likely French, would use to convince the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to accept Marada Movement leader Sleiman Franjieh's candidacy for president.
But others around Qatar would oppose it. They suggest that the best course of action is to persuade Hezbollah to nominate Lebanese armed Commander Major General Joseph Aoun rather than Franjieh.
Given that he is the candidate that the US, France, and Saudi Arabia support in his election, the army commander received signs of assurances regarding his candidacy some time ago.
Suppose "Hezbollah" impedes the nomination of the head of the military establishment. In that case, the situation will require a "settlement" from Saudi Arabia towards "Hezbollah" and from the Americans.
The return will be for the Americans to lift the sanctions imposed on "Hezbollah" and for Saudi Arabia to resume providing financial support to Lebanon.
The basis of the settlement above also includes lifting the sanctions against Gebran Bassil, the leader of the "Free Patriotic Movement," especially now that Qatar has taken up this issue and is making efforts to resolve it. The question being researched right now is: What would it take for "Hezbollah" to accept Joseph Aoun's candidacy?
However, such information has not yet been based on solid foundations, with no envoy dispatched to Lebanon to speak with Hezbollah about the initiative or provide any official formulation, making the party wary of dealing with the matter because:
First, the Americans have not announced the army commander's candidacy because they fear Hezbollah will veto it. After all, it will see him as their candidate.
The second and most significant point is that Saudi Arabia is still in the early stages of dealing with Lebanon and has not yet added it to its agenda. It has also not publicly stated its position toward any candidates, even though it implicitly favors the army commander.
The "Free Patriotic Movement," which the Qataris approached, also disapproved of Joseph Aoun's candidacy. They reasoned that Aoun's appointment to the position would endanger Bassil because Aoun could win over FPM supporters from the families of military personnel. However, the primary and most crucial query is: Will Hezbollah agree to any settlement regarding the nomination of Joseph Aoun?
Sources familiar with the issue confirm that "Hezbollah" did not receive any Qatari offer or initiative related to the nomination of the army commander, nor did Joseph Aoun approach the party with his desire to run for the presidency.
Aoun avoids dealing with him as a presidential candidate, even though he has a work team that visited Moscow to approach the Russians about his candidacy and visited Qatar. The presidency was one of the main topics discussed with Qatari officials, and the same issue was under discussion with the French.
Aoun is hesitant to declare his candidacy for several reasons, including the need to amend the constitution, which cannot happen unless there is an agreement that he should be elected. He doesn't want to ruin his relationship with the political forces because he thinks the ground for his candidacy has yet to mature, especially given how long the current presidential vacancy will last. In this scenario, he will be compelled to fulfill his security role to maintain stability.
If he could maintain stability throughout the presidential vacuum, he would have strengthened his position.
Hezbollah follows a straightforward formula that states it has a candidate named Sleiman Franjieh and does not have any second alternative plan. It will keep working to win his election. However, those working on the Qatari initiative believe that the solution will come directly as Franjieh will discover that his election is unlikely and that the settlement is predicated on someone else's election, prompting him to withdraw on his own.
However, Hezbollah finds it illogical to build on this suggestion because it traditionally does not anticipate events and bases its positions on hypotheses.
The Qatari initiative, when it exists and if profound ideas are put forward, will serve as the beginning of international and regional interest in Lebanon and open the doors to presidential discussions.
It is untrue what some people have been saying in the media about the return of S-S (Seen Seen in Arabic in reference to Syria and Saudi Arabia), linking it to the trip made by the head of Syria's intelligence Major General Hossam Louk, to Saudi Arabia via Beirut. According to informed sources, Syria has no substantial interest in Lebanon for two reasons: first, it is preoccupied with its own affairs and trying to solve its economic problems; second, its interference in the Lebanese file is linked to its relationship with the Secretary-General of Hezbollah, Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, to decide what he deems appropriate.