The Palestinian, Lebanese, Syrian, Iraqi, and Yemeni peoples have realized that stability is impossible due to the Iranian project, which prevents them from establishing a national state—one with sovereignty and governed internally according to the constitution.
According to the Lebanese newspaper, it is not enough that these people succeeded in preventing the Iranian project from imposing its will, as the passage of time worked in favor of this project. They continue to live amidst chaos, instability, and lawlessness.
Their confrontation should not be limited to defending themselves, their values, and their visions.
Instead, they must transition from defense to offense, defending their right to live in natural states like modern countries, prioritizing only their homeland and the interests of their people.
The events so far have demonstrated three fundamental facts:
The first fact is that the United States does not consider itself concerned with delineating the boundaries of Iran's role as long as it remains within Iranian geography.
This is either due to strategic considerations, where Washington sees the balance between Sunnis and Shiites and the rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran as serving its strategy or because it is not forced to engage in a costly war as long as Iran does not threaten its interests, said al-Joumhouria.
As stated by the newspaper, the events following the 'Al-Aqsa Flood' have shown that the United States has worked to neutralize Iran despite knowing that Iranian proxies do not act regionally without Iranian orders.
Neither the Houthis nor Hezbollah would dare to threaten international navigation without Iran's approval.
And what has transpired indicates that it is not possible to bet, until further notice, on a US strike to overthrow the Iranian regime similar to its overthrow of the Iraqi regime, nor on a strike to end Iranian proxies, nor on its threat to use force if Tehran does not cease its destabilizing role in the stability of the region's countries.
The second fact is that Arab countries are unable to confront Iran or put an end to its proxies in some Arab countries.
They relied on Washington to bear its responsibilities based on the historical alliance relationship, but it did not shoulder this responsibility for the reasons mentioned in the first fact.
However, after Tehran felt the extent of external isolation and internal resentment, it sought rapprochement with Saudi Arabia, shifting the bilateral relationship from hostility to cooling.
Despite the kingdom's firm rejection of Iran's interference in Arab countries' affairs and its rejection of establishing militias that undermine sovereignty, nothing has changed in Iran's expansionist behavior.
It claims that non-state forces operating in Yemen, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Palestine are an integral part of the people of these countries and have their political calculations and considerations.
The third fact is that Iran still needs to fully integrate the countries where it has established militias into its project. However, it has transformed these countries into arenas and connected them by uniting them.
Tehran is not yet capable of fully controlling them, nor are national forces capable of restoring the existing national state based on one weapon and the principle of the state.
The danger in this confrontation is that the national components in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen need to receive the practical support enjoyed by the regional Iranian components.
This support allows Iran to exert more influence, power, expansion, and control.
It relies on the factor of time, which gradually transforms it into an undeniable force that cannot be reversed.
According to al-Joumhouria, it maximizes control over the decisions of these countries and aligns them with Iran.
In this context, some legitimate questions must be raised: Can the Houthis be quickly reintegrated into the project of a national state in Yemen based on a single constitution, weapon, and Yemeni priorities?
Can the Popular Mobilization Forces be disarmed after being legalized and becoming stronger than the Iraqi army?
What kind of state can emerge under the influence of external weapons? Will Hezbollah initiate the disarmament of its weapons, or will it cling to them and seek to legalize them by replicating the Iraqi model?
Will the party agree to relinquish its arms in accordance with the Taif Agreement and Resolution 1559? Is the party's project to relinquish its weapons and engage in the state, or is it to arm itself further and fully control the state?
Assuming that Israel is the driving force behind Hezbollah's armament, what is the driving force behind the armament of the Houthis and the Popular Mobilization Forces? Therefore, armament is not related to Israel or any other factor but rather is part of an expansionary religious project.
The answers to the questions above are supposed to be clear, unified, and not subject to interpretation, implying that the components created, funded, and armed by Iran constitute an integral part of the Iranian Islamic revolution project or the Wilayat al-Faqih.
This means that retracting from this expansion contradicts and opposes the religious project upon which the Iranian state has been founded since it assumed power in 1979.
Therefore, the issue needs to be more political to allow voluntary retreat or debate; instead, it is somewhat religious.
From this perspective, it is imperative to avoid three fundamental errors:
The sin of dealing with the Lebanese branch of the Iranian regional religious project simplistically, linking it incorrectly to the false notion that every sect in Lebanon has ventured, differentiated, returned, and assembled under the umbrella of partnership and that the fate of political Shiism will not differ from other sects.
This simplification is misplaced and disastrous and leads to numbing the adversaries of this project, which will not stop at the boundaries of legitimizing its illegitimate status quo. Legalization is rejected, and it will continue its pursuit to fully integrate the countries in which it operates into its main center in Tehran.
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-Joumhouria stated that the sin lies in dealing with the Iranian project as if it is susceptible to integration with states and societies, either by controlling them or keeping them in chaos until they are controlled, making it impossible to imagine a regression to pre-Iranian revolution times.
In the depths of Iranian revolutionary religious thinking, this expansion in the Shiite context, which raises the banner of Wilayat al-Faqih, has corrected a historical situation that cannot be reversed. Instead, it presents the prospect of further infiltration and expansion.
Therefore, it was necessary to be aware of the danger of this project early and to confront it centrally on the one hand and its arms on the other. This does not mean it is too late, but it isn't easy to revert the Middle East to its pre-1979 state.
The sin lies in relying solely on time or traditional confrontations undertaken by national forces in Palestine, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen because there are no indications of a retreat of this project nor any signs of Washington's intention to forcibly overthrow it or coerce it into changing its role from military to political or forcing it back within its borders.
Consequently, it will continue to dominate the arenas it expands into, and its non-state projects will be stronger than the national components because it supplies them with weapons, money, and support in a central confrontation chamber.
So, how can, for example, Hezbollah, which enjoys armament support, or the Popular Mobilization Forces and the Houthis be overcome?
Starting from the lack of American priority for a severe confrontation with the destabilizing Iranian project in the region, the lack of Arab capability to confront this project, and the fact that the components of the Iranian project are more potent than the national forces in the Arab countries, and from the ceiling of separate confrontations undertaken by national forces being resilience in the face of regressive fighting, says
al-Joumhouria.
Therefore, based on all this, the required action is to organize the confrontation on new triangular bases:
They are first transitioning from separate confrontation to unified confrontation, meaning unifying efforts between national forces in Palestine, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. They consider it one confrontation and one battle against a single project that prevents the establishment of a national state in the Arab capitals under their control.
Thus, similar to the method the resistance used to unify the adopted arenas, it is necessary to unify efforts and confrontation, and the raising of voices should be unified, not separate. This unity strengthens the confrontation and improves its conditions.
Secondly, forming a unified front that includes opposition forces to the Iranian project in Palestine, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen and coordinating joint steps, starting from political statements criticizing the Iranian project to organizing visits by unified delegations to Arab and Western capitals rejecting the Iranian project, which prevents the peoples of these countries from enjoying stability and prosperity.
Thirdly, transitioning from describing the crises in Palestine, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen as local crises to considering them as part of a regional crisis caused by one entity.
Mainly since Washington, for example, deals with Hezbollah as a Lebanese problem, the Popular Mobilization Forces as an Iraqi problem, the Houthis as a Yemeni problem, Hamas as a Palestinian problem, and the Syrian regime as a Syrian problem, as stated by the Lebanese newspaper.
Therefore, the response to the unity of the resistance arenas should be with the same weapon: uniting the opposition arenas in the region.
This means uniting the forces affected by the unity of the arenas and preventing the establishment of national states in Palestine, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen.