Iraq and Lebanon: Two states caught in the same cycle

Report by Nada Andraos, English adaptation by Mariella Succar

Iraq has not become like Lebanon. Not in its history, nor in its composition. But it has moved closer to a model that Lebanese people know well: power divided among different groups, political patronage, leaders stronger than institutions, corruption, and weapons whose use is not always decided solely by the state.

This is how Iraq’s situation since the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime in 2003 can be summed up.

Since then, Iraq has moved from a highly centralized system to one based on a balance among Shiites, Sunnis and Kurds.

Over time, a political convention became entrenched: The prime minister is Shiite, the parliament speaker is Sunni and the president is Kurdish.

The arrangement is reminiscent of Lebanon, where the president is Maronite, the prime minister is Sunni and the parliament speaker is Shiite.

The stated goal was to ensure the participation of all groups, but participation turned into political patronage, much like in Lebanon: One party gets a ministry, another political bloc gets a government agency, while jobs and projects become part of deals among political and sectarian forces.

Then there are the weapons.

In Lebanon, Hezbollah emerged in the 1980s and developed into a political and military force strategically linked to Iran, outside the structure of the Lebanese army.

In Iraq, the Popular Mobilization Forces emerged in their current form in 2014. They were established to fight the Islamic State group and were later formally incorporated into Iraq’s security establishment.

The two cases are legally and historically different, but the similarity is clear: An armed force with political and military influence and close ties to Iran raises questions about the limits of state authority.

The same pattern is repeated in corruption and governance.

Iraq is a wealthy oil-producing country, while Lebanon has limited resources. But when public-sector positions become political spoils and institutions turn into spheres of influence, accountability weakens and government formation becomes a bargaining process over positions and gains.

Then there is the U.S.-Iranian rivalry.

In Iraq, Washington toppled Saddam’s regime and remained a major security and political player, while Tehran built extensive influence through political parties, armed factions and its influence over governments.

In Lebanon, Washington supports the army and state institutions, while Iran’s relationship with Hezbollah represents its most prominent instrument of influence.

From Baghdad to Beirut, the names and circumstances are different, but the crisis is the same:

When protecting diversity turns into political patronage, patronage turns into corruption, weapons become a source of influence, and foreign powers become partners in decision-making, the state becomes weaker than its constituent groups.

So can Iraq and Lebanon build states stronger than sectarian affiliation, political parties, weapons and foreign influence? Or will they remain arenas for conflicts greater than themselves?