General Joseph Aoun's position amidst the Quincy meeting discussions

The candidacy of Army Commander General Joseph Aoun is still part of the Quincy meeting, and he has never been excluded from the list of favored candidates. 

However, the internal Lebanese scene seems to be leaning towards an opposition candidate versus a candidate from the ruling coalition.

 

The pressure that prevailed recently has subsided slightly, raising questions and expectations of a swift presidential election session.

 

The deadlines set to accelerate the election of a new president, whether linked to the Arab summit or the Quincy meeting that was postponed, seem practically unattainable, according to sources. This applies to both the Amal-Hezbollah and Marada Movement and the deputies who met with Saudi Ambassador Walid Bukhari.

However, those familiar with ongoing discussions between the Quincy members for weeks argue that attention should be directed to what Qatar is doing rather than the Saudi ambassador in Beirut to indicate Quincy's direction.

From the beginning, Doha has acted as if it is closer to the Washington perspective and, to a large extent, the Saudi perspective as an official decision. In its diplomatic moves that have begun and will be repeated in Beirut or in external communications, it acts as if an undeclared chart still has not been infiltrated.

The highly cautious US administration regarding Arab and Saudi steps towards Syria has not yet revealed its secret, although Qatar is the closest to knowing its hints.

Both Doha and Washington act as if they are not concerned about the Lebanese pressures or the interpretation of the Saudi movement in Beirut in a different manner from what it is.

According to sources familiar with the matter, it should be noted that what is conveyed about Saudi Arabia in Lebanon does not approximate the actual Saudi stance within the Quincy, which is still in effect with the other four capitals dealing with Riyadh based on it.

These sources emphasize that since the first day of the five countries' involvement in the presidential elections, the situation remains the same: 50% for Army Commander General Joseph Aoun versus 50% for other candidates, including the leader of the Marada Movement Sleiman Frangieh and the opposition's chosen candidate.

Nevertheless, this American-Egyptian-Qatari approach is still prevailing.

Sources indicate that as long as Aoun remains part of the presidential equation, it practically means that transitioning from the currently proposed formulas in Beirut would require a new program for election management. The data necessitates stating that the Amal-Hezbollah duo is not accepting the army commander at the time, despite the pressures of the Quincy, even if Paris explicitly announces dropping its presidential initiative because it does not yield its actual value. The duo cannot benefit from it.

As for abandoning Frangieh in return for the opposition abandoning its candidate, both cannot secure 65 votes, meaning that the exchange would be made at internal and external costs, which is not contingent on the near future.

According to the data, Paris, which intervened in the presidential race knowing well the stances of the four countries, has become closer to dealing with its initiative as if it is no longer viable, even if it does not announce its failure, and that there is a gradual approach to the next phase that should be handled wisely.

Moreover, after the increase in Lebanese criticism, its new administration of the presidential file drives it more towards dealing with its partners based on the broad outlines for the future.

The five countries are still looking for the specifications of the comprehensive settlement, including a president, government, and ministers. In the context of their search for a way to pull Lebanon away from the closed circle of candidates for the presidency on presidential, governmental, and ministerial levels, which were part of the same political class that the Lebanese protesters revolted against on October 17.

This narrowing of options, which was supposed to contribute to presenting a new and different settlement from the prevailing pattern, was met with contradictions. This raises extensive discussions about the possibilities of reaching a formula that surpasses the expectations of those who will assume power in the next stage.

The irony that those familiar with the Quincy discussions highlight is that they clearly discuss the future stage of the Lebanese situation and its political and economic dimensions within a broad political framework, unlike the Lebanese forces that drown in daily details without seeking prospects for the crisis's future or proposing comprehensive solutions beyond the presidential elections.

All of this casts its shadow on the recent rush under the pressures that suggested that the election had become imminent and that the 65 votes for Frangieh were in the duo's grasp.