Can lessons from Northern Ireland and Afghanistan guide Lebanon’s weapons debate?

Report by Wissam Nasrallah, English adaptation by Karine Keuchkerian 

"The UK is working closely with other friends of Lebanon to promote stability, security, and prosperity. Peace and political solutions are key steps to achieving that," Hamish Cowell, the British ambassador to Lebanon, said in a post on X following his meeting with Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri. 

For Cowell’s country, the United Kingdom, there is experience in pursuing political solutions rather than relying on military ones.

This experience dates back to the late 1960s, when Northern Ireland sank into an internal conflict between two communities with opposing identities: loyalists seeking unification with the Republic of Ireland, and unionists determined to remain part of the United Kingdom.

The war was not ended by a military campaign or by a decisive victory for one side. Instead, it concluded with a political agreement known as the Good Friday Agreement, based on the recognition by both sides that in a conflict spanning three decades, there was no absolute winner or loser, and that consensus was the only path to disarmament. 

The agreement included clear guarantees for each side to enter the political process without fear for their existence or identity. Accordingly, the Irish Republican Army voluntarily handed over its weapons, along with opposing groups, once politics — not battle — became the guarantee.

The opposite occurred in Afghanistan. The United States attempted to enforce disarmament by force, overthrowing the Taliban, besieging its fighters, and building a new army and political system. 

Without an internal agreement and without the Taliban’s acceptance of a political framework, once foreign forces withdrew, weapons returned to the forefront, and the Taliban regained power.

The differences between these examples and Lebanon are significant. Lebanon’s circumstances differ radically from Northern Ireland: Hezbollah’s regional role extends beyond the state, the military struggle is external against Israel rather than internal, and Israel’s military superiority is decisive. 

Likewise, the Afghan case is unlike Lebanon or Ireland: the Taliban were never part of a consensual local political system; they were an armed movement facing foreign occupation, and later returned to power after the state left behind by Washington collapsed.

From these experiences, one principle emerges: weapons cannot be removed by force or imposed solutions from outside. Even if disarmed by such means, lasting peace will not result. “Healthy” disarmament must be built on internal consensus, in a form that includes all parties without excluding anyone, where the weapon holder is convinced that the weapon is no longer necessary or effective.

From this perspective, Cowell’s messages — and those of the international community — are clear: any solution regarding weapons in Lebanon, and any future roadmap, must proceed through politics, not force. Israel must understand this, even with its military advantage.